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PENTAGON

30 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF USIB

SUBJECT: Informal Notes on Paragraphs of [] Soviet Plans
and Policies Related to the German Situation

1. Attached are notes on paragraphs of the subject [] report based on discussions among agency representatives of Watch Committee members held in NIC 1000 hours, 29 September. They are forwarded as a working paper in connection with the General Assessment of this report developed by the Watch Committee at a meeting at 1400 hours 29 September 1961.

[]
JAMES J. HITCHCOCK
Director

Attachment - Notes on Paragraphs of []

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[REDACTED]

Notes on Paragraphs of [REDACTED]
the German Situation.

Soviet Plans and Policies related to

Para 1 - October Exercises: In addition to the TASS announcement that the Warsaw Pact forces will conduct exercises during October and November (which was made subsequent to the source's report that combined exercises would begin in the first week of October), there are a number of indications of impending exercises. The scope and nature of these exercises cannot yet be determined, but it should be possible to obtain considerable information on them as they begin. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] an order to implement the "green-striped open order" beginning 2 October. It should be noted that preparations required for exercises would be equally consistent with an increased readiness posture "under the guise of exercises," as well as highly effective as a backdrop to further negotiations.

Para 2 - Purpose of Exercises: As noted above, maneuvers would increase combat readiness but would also be consistent with political pressure for negotiations. The subterfuge implied in real preparations under the guise of exercises will be difficult to penetrate. The source is consistently ambiguous on the "strike first" and at no time has specified whether the strike is to be intercontinental, a ground-air assault on Western Europe or a limited attack along the Berlin access roads or air corridors. Although the general context of this and other reports from this source tends to imply a European attack, reference is made to a move into Iran and to the Chinese Communists defending against attacks from Japan. There is a notable absence of references to strategic missiles in discussions of the strike, despite the fact that the source has numerous contacts [REDACTED]

Para 3 - Mobilization: There is no evidence that a general Soviet mobilization has occurred or is contemplated. We consider 400,000 men to be a reasonable figure for the number of men being retained in the Soviet armed forces in accordance with the announcement that "necessary numbers" of men due for release this year would be held in service until after the German peace treaty. Previous independent calculations have led us to believe that as many as 350,000 conscripts would probably be retained. The official statements have stipulated retention until the peace treaty is signed; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Para 4 - High Military Officers: We have no information that unusual numbers of Satellite officers are or have been in Moscow recently, but we do not necessarily obtain such information and consider it possible that increased numbers have been there in connection with current Warsaw Pact planning. Several senior Soviet officers (Marshals Malinovskiy, Grechko, Sokolovskiy and Golikov) have been on

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visits recently in Eastern Europe, which may be what source meant by "in the field." Apart from Konev's appointment as CinC of GSFG, and of Army General Batov as commander of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, we know of no other recent changes in command in key areas. There have been some recent flights into the European forward areas and of transports to areas associated with Soviet ICBM and MRBM deployment, which could relate to source's statement that artillery officers have been visiting sites to check on missile-warhead assembly procedures. We can neither confirm nor refute that missiles with nuclear warheads have recently been moved to tactical and strategic missile bases, but this source has reported earlier that he knows of two storage sites for nuclear warheads for missiles in the Soviet forces in Germany.

Para 5 - Khrushchev's Intentions: Commented on in the General Assessment.

Para 6 - Party Dissensions: We cannot comment on differences within the Presidium but note that Mikoyan would be a logical person to protest against Khrushchev's policies; few others would have the seniority and status to oppose the leader. We believe that the military is well under Party control and that the military leadership will bow to Khrushchev's orders despite their more conservative misgivings on the power balance. Khrushchev has recently stated--on 7 August--that in a Soviet-US clash "neither side would be ready to admit defeat without having used all weapons, even the most destructive--."

Para 7 - Malinovskiy Views: We cannot assess the accuracy of Malinovskiy's remarks. We have evidence that Malinovskiy did attend a party conference in the Carpathian Military District between 17 and 21 September but note that Malinovskiy is already a Party delegate from Moscow and is unlikely to have been elected to represent Lvov.

Para 8 - Party Congress: We regard the description of the tone of the Party Congress as quite plausible, although it is not clear whether the views in the rest of the paragraph are those of the senior Party official or of the source. An aggressive militant tone at the Congress is considered quite probable, particularly if no progress toward negotiations has been accomplished by then; such a posture would also be consistent with planned hostilities.

Para 9 - Attendance at Congress: We consider the attendance of foreign party officials at a Soviet Party congress to be quite expectable, although it seems doubtful that Mao would attend in the light of what we believe the state of Sino-Soviet relations to be. If he does attend, it will have great implications as to the condition of the Sino-Soviet relationship and as to the seriousness with which the Communist world is regarding the Berlin crisis.

There is evidence available that foreigners will be discouraged from visiting Moscow in this period; the Embassy was informed on 27 September that only very

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[redacted]

limited and undesirable accommodations will be available for Embassy visitors for the next six weeks, and KLM was ordered on 29 September to evacuate its quarters in a downtown Moscow hotel. In addition, a group of Western peace marchers has been ordered to be out of the Western USSR by 8 October.

With regard to a PVO combat alert, there have been reports, that a similar alert was laid on during the 7 November celebrations in 1960, and one may be considered necessary for such an important gathering as the Party Congress in view of current international tension.

Para 10 - Move Into Iran: Reports [redacted] indicated that certain improvements were being made in Soviet military positions along the Iranian border, including repairing of gun positions and trench construction. It has also been alleged that villages along a section of the border were evacuated several months ago. There has been some redispotioning of major Soviet units within both the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts, including the introduction of some airborne elements, within the past 18 months, but there is no available evidence of a current buildup of forces.

Although we consider it extremely unlikely that Soviet intelligence on Iran (which is certainly very good) could have erroneously identified three US missile bases in Iran, the Soviets have made such charges in the past and have offered to show Iranian officials where they were on a map.

[redacted]

Paras 11 and 12 - Civil Defense; Officer Shifts: [redacted]

[redacted] supports the plausibility that decisions on civil defense matters were being taken at that time. If such a civil defense command has been established, we should expect to see manifestations of intensified activity in the civil defense field

[redacted] Marshal Chuikov was identified as the CInC of the Ground Forces on 20 September in a Soviet press account of his visit to Tbilisi. Nonetheless, we cannot discount that his deputy, Army General Zhadov, may now be acting in this post and that Chuikov has been appointed to the Civil Defense command, as stated by source. It is also possible that Marshal Chuikov is holding such

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a post in addition to his duties as CinC of the Ground Forces, particularly since it is considered possible that the normal responsibilities of the CinC of the Ground Forces may include some duties in this field.

Marshal Sokolovskiy's recent attendance at Bulgaria's Liberation Day ceremonies may lend some support to the possibility that he is now occupying some important military post. We have no indication, other than two recent public appearances in Moscow, once reportedly in uniform, that Marshal Zhukov now occupies any official post.

Para 13 - Reinforcement of GSFG: Marshal Konev's command as CinC of GSFG includes seven armies, six ground and one air. If his command extends to Poland (which is not illogical, although there are no other indications of this), he would command the equivalent of nine armies. The reinforcement of GSFG by six or more SAM units this year is supported by the identification of several new Soviet SAM sites and the withdrawal of the 100mm AA battalions from the seven Soviet AAA brigades in East Germany. further reinforcement of GSFG with SAM units is planned.

With regard to the possible planned reinforcement of Konev's command by the Eighth Mechanized Army, this army is identified in the Carpathian Military District, as stated by source, but we believe the designation "mechanized army" to be obsolete in Soviet terminology and are curious as to its appearance in this report. There is no indication as yet of an impending move by this army;

There have been a number of rumors from Poland, particularly in early September, of impending Soviet troop movements along the rail line from Lvov into southeastern Poland, but there has been no evidence that any significant movement of Soviet forces into or across Poland has yet occurred. We also have no evidence as yet of the assembly of rolling stock in Eastern Europe on a scale which would be required to support movements of army size. However, some future movements, although not necessarily of the Eighth Mechanized Army, cannot be entirely discounted.

Para 14 - Nuclear Tests: We believe that the view may well be true that the present nuclear tests are to check out delivery systems but note that only four of the twenty shots can be associated with missiles, that air drops from BADGER/TU-16s continue (though this was tested in 1958), and that there is no evidence available of tests of such more advanced weapons as air-to-surface nuclear missiles.

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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER

NIC No. 26548

Room BC 956
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29 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF USIB

SUBJECT: General Assessment of Soviet Plans and Policies Related to the German Situation

1. The report outlines a Soviet course of action in the Berlin crisis which is plausible in some respects and considerably more ominous in intention than other information and experience has led us to conclude. In brief, the report asserts that Khrushchev has already decided to sign a German treaty "right after" the Party Congress and "to strike first against the West if the situation warrants action" after the treaty is signed. In the meantime apparent Soviet readiness to negotiate is designed to keep the situation in hand while Warsaw Pact maneuvers and resumed nuclear weapons tests put the USSR in the best posture for eventualities including attack. An attack against Iran is also envisaged, and the Communist Chinese will "protect against attack from Japan."

2. The report runs contrary to the current assessment that Khrushchev thinks he can make progress towards solving the Berlin situation on his terms through negotiations and that he does not regard nuclear war as a means of achieving this objective. It suggests that Khrushchev is prepared and willing to run much higher risks than we had thought. The report is not entirely clear on the question of what "situation" would warrant a Soviet "strike first;" however, the source has earlier stated that the signing of the treaty would be followed immediately by blocking of access to Berlin on the ground and in the air (an act which the Soviets undoubtedly recognize as carrying a high degree of risk). Nor does this report or earlier reports by the source define what the first strike would be.

3. In general, we regard the report as relating to contingency plans rather than to a firmly decided course of action, although to the source, whose contacts appear largely limited to military circles, the distinction between these two may have become blurred. We are thus inclined to believe that the report, which we accept as an accurate reflection of the source's knowledge, presents considerable information, though incomplete and in a few instances of doubtful accuracy, regarding Soviet contingency planning in the Berlin crisis. We do not believe, however, that the report reflects knowledge of political factors necessarily involved in a decision of such importance as that of "striking first." It seems unreasonable that the Soviet leaders would not wish to give due consideration to developments in the negotiating process under way between the US and the USSR, or

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that they would already have made a firm decision to interfere with Berlin access after signing the treaty. We have insufficient evidence to accept or reject the implications of the report that Khrushchev is prepared to launch a general nuclear war if the West does not accept Bloc demands in the Berlin situation. We believe, however, the report must be taken seriously as reflecting a possible sequence of events in the Berlin crisis.

FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WATCH COMMITTEE:

[REDACTED]

JAMES J. HITCHCOCK
Director

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GENERAL ASSESSMENT

1. The report outlines a Soviet course of action in the Berlin crisis which is plausible in some respects and considerably more ominous in intention than other information and experience had led us to conclude. In brief, the report asserts that Khrushchev has already decided to sign a German treaty "right after" the Party Congress and "to strike first against the West if the situation warrants action" after the treaty is signed. In the meantime apparent Soviet readiness to negotiate is designed to keep the situation in hand while Warsaw Pact maneuvers and resumed nuclear weapons tests put the USSR in the best posture for attack. An attack against Iran is also envisaged, and the Communist Chinese would "protect against attack from Japan."

2. The report suggests that our current assessment that Khrushchev thinks he can make progress towards solving the Berlin situation on his terms through negotiations and that he does not regard nuclear war as a means of achieving this objective, may be wrong. It suggests, too, that Khrushchev is prepared and even

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eager to run much higher risks than we had thought. However, the report is not entirely clear on the question of what "situation" would warrant a Soviet "strike first;" the source has earlier stated that the signing of the treaty would be followed immediately by blocking of access to Berlin on the ground and in the air. We believe that it is unlikely that Khrushchev would have made a decision to carry forward these actions, with their very grave risk provoking hostilities, with as little consideration for Western reaction as is indicated in the report. We note also that the report and earlier references to a first strike have not defined what the first strike would be -- intercontinental, confined to the Autobahn on the ground, or some action in-between. In general, we regard the Soviet actions reported in this document as contingency plans rather than as intended action, although to the source, whose contacts appear limited to military circles, the distinction between these two may have become blurred. We are thus inclined to believe that the report, which we accept as an accurate reflection of the source's knowledge, presents considerable information, though incomplete and in a few instances of doubtful accuracy, regarding Soviet contingency planning in the Berlin crisis. We do not

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believe, however, that the report takes into account political factors necessarily involved in a decision of such importance as that of "striking first," nor does it give due consideration to developments in the negotiating process under way between the US and the USSR which would materially affect the pace and nature of Soviet actions regarding the signing of a peace treaty and the disposition of Berlin access controls.

3. Despite the shortcomings noted above, we believe the report must be taken seriously as reflecting a possible sequence of events in the Berlin crisis, some already borne out by events since the report was obtained and some verifiable in the next week or so. We note, however, that even if events forecast through the Party Congress take place in the manner reported by the source, it will still not be possible to give full credence to the report's predictions of Soviet action on the treaty and on interference with Berlin access. Nevertheless, we believe we should take into consideration the course of action put forth by this source as one of a number of possible alternative lines of development of the Berlin crisis and maintain a sharp watch for evidence strengthening its plausibility.

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DETAILED ASSESSMENT

Para 1: In addition to the TASS announcement that the Warsaw Pact forces will conduct exercises during October and November (which was made subsequent to the source's report that combined exercises would begin in the first week of October), there are a number of indications of impending exercises. The scope and nature of these exercises cannot yet be determined, but it should be possible to obtain considerable information on them as they begin. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] R70-14
[REDACTED] HR70-14
It should be noted that the exercises on the scale reported by the source would be consistent with an increased readiness posture "under the guise of exercises" as well as highly effective as a backdrop to further negotiations.

Para 2: As noted above maneuvers would increase combat readiness but would also be consistent with political pressure for negotiations. The subterfuge implied in real preparations under the guise of exercises will be difficult to penetrate. The source is consistently ambiguous on the "strike first" and at no time has specified whether the strike is to be intercontinental, a ground-air assault on Western Europe or a limited attack along the Berlin access roads or air corridors. Although the general context tends to imply a European attack, there is reference to attack on Iran and to the Chinese Communists defending against attacks from Japan. There is a notable

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absence of references to strategic missiles in discussions of the strike, despite the fact that the source's contacts appear to be predominantly associated with artillery.

Para 3: There is no evidence that a general Soviet mobilization has occurred or is contemplated. We consider 400,000 men to be reasonable figure for the number of men being retained in the Soviet armed forces in accordance with the announcement that "necessary numbers" of men due for release this year would be held in service until after the German peace treaty. Previous independent calculations have led us to believe that as many as 350,000 conscripts would probably be retained. The official statements have stipulated retention until the peace treaty is signed; one reference has been made to next spring.

Para 4: We have no information that unusual numbers of Satellite officers are or have been in Moscow recently, but we do not necessarily obtain such information and consider it possible that increased numbers have been there in connection with current Warsaw Pact planning. Several senior Soviet officers (Marshals Malinovskiy, Grechko, Sokolovskiy and Golikov) have been on visits recently in Eastern Europe, which may be what source means by "in the field." Apart from Konev's appointment

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as CinC of GSFG, and of Army General Batov as commander of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, we know of no other recent changes in command in key areas.

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could relate to source's statement that artillery officers have been visiting sites to check on missile-warhead assembly procedures. We can neither confirm nor refute that missiles with nuclear warheads have recently been moved to tactical and strategic missile bases, but this source has reported that there are two storage sites for nuclear warheads for missiles in the Soviet forces in Germany.

Para 5: Commented on in the General Assessment.

Para 6: We cannot comment on differences within the Presidium but note that Mikoyan would be a logical one to protest against Khrushchev's policies; few others would have the seniority and status to oppose the leader. We believe that the military is well under Party control and that the military leadership will bow to Khrushchev's orders despite more conservative misgivings on the power balance.

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Khrushchev has recently stated---on 7 August---that in a Soviet-US clash
"neither side would be ready to admit defeat without having used all weapons,
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Para 7: We cannot assess the accuracy of Malinovskiy's remarks. We have
evidence that Malinovskiy did visit a party conference in the Carpathian Military
District between 17 and 21 September but note that Malinovskiy is already a
Party delegate from Moscow.

Para 8: We regard the description of the tone of the Party Congress as quite
plausible, although it is not clear whether the rest of the paragraph is from the
senior Party official or is the source's own views. An aggressive posture at the
Congress is considered quite probable, particularly if no progress toward nego-
tiations has been accomplished by then; such a posture would also be consistent
with planned hostilities.

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Para 9: We consider the attendance of foreign party officials at a Soviet Party congress to be quite expectable, although it is doubtful that Mao would attend in the light of what we believe the state of Sino-Soviet relations to be. If he does attend, it will have great implications as to the condition of the Sino-Soviet relationship and as to the view the Communist world is taking of the Berlin crisis.

There is evidence available that foreigners will be discouraged from visiting Moscow in this period; the Embassy was informed on 27 September that only very limited and undesirable accommodations will be available for visitors for the next six weeks, and KLM was ordered on 29 September to evacuate its quarters in a downtown Moscow hotel.

We are unable to understand why a PVO combat alert would be ordered for the period of the Congress unless for psychological effect. There have been reports, however, that a similar alert was laid on during the 7 November celebrations in 1960.

Para 10: certain improvements were being made in Soviet military positions along the Iranian border, including re-pairing of gun positions and trench construction. It has also been alleged that villages along a section of the border were evacuated several months ago. There has been some redistribution of major Soviet units within both the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts, including the introduction of some airborne elements, within the past 18 months, but there is no available evidence of a current buildup of forces.

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Although we consider it extremely unlikely that Soviet intelligence on Iran (which is certainly very good) could have erroneously identified three US missile bases in Iran, the Soviets have made such charges in the past.

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Paras 11 and 12: []

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supports the plausibility that decisions on civil defense matters were being taken at that time. If such a civil defense command has been established, we should expect to see manifestations of intensified activity in the civil defense field []

[] Marshal Chuikov was identified as the CinC of the Ground Forces on 20 September in a Soviet press account of his visit to Tbilisi.

Nonetheless, we cannot discount that his deputy, Army General Zhadov, may now be acting in this post and that Chuikov has been appointed to the Civil Defense command as stated by source. It is also possible that Marshal Chuikov is holding such a post

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in addition to his duties as CinC of the Ground Forces, particularly since it is considered possible that the normal responsibilities of the CinC of the Ground Forces may include some duties in this field.

Marshal Sokolovskiy's recent attendance at Bulgaria's Liberation Day ceremonies may lend some support to the possibility that he is now occupying some important military post. We have no indication, other than two recent public appearances in uniform in Moscow, that Marshal Zhukov now occupies any official post.

Para 13: Marshal Konev's command as CinC of GSFG includes seven armies, six ground and one air. If his command actually extends to Poland (which is not illogical although there are no other [] indications of this), he would command the equivalent of nine armies. The reinforcement of GSFG by six or more SAM units this year is supported by the identification of several new Soviet SAM sites and the withdrawal of the 100mm AA battalions from the seven Soviet AAA brigades in East Germany. The report suggests, however, that a further reinforcement of GSFG with SAM units is planned.

With regard to the possible planned reinforcement of Konev's command by the Eighth Mechanized Army, this army is identified in the Carpathian Military District, as stated by source, but we believe the designation "mechanized army" to be obsolete in Soviet terminology. There is no indication as yet of an

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impending move by this army; [] recent observations of the garrisons of one of its subordinate divisions revealed apparent normal occupancy. There have been a number of rumors from Poland, particularly in early September, of impending Soviet troop movements along the rail line from Lvov into southeastern Poland, but there has been no evidence that any significant movement of Soviet forces into or across Poland has yet occurred. We also have no evidence as yet of the assembly of rolling stock in Eastern Europe on a scale which would be required to support movements of army size. However, some future movements, although not necessarily of the Eighth Mechanized Army, cannot be entirely discounted. A group of Western "peace marchers" has been directed to be out of the western USSR by 8 October, and the Polish press was told to expect another crisis about the time of the Soviet Party Congress.

Para 14: We believe that the view that the present nuclear tests are to check out delivery systems but note that only three of the twenty shots can be associated with missiles, that air drops from BADGER/TU-16s continue, though this was done in 1958, and that there is no evidence available of tests of such more advanced weapons as air-to-surface missiles.

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Detailed Evaluation

Para 1. October Exercises

- 25 September - TASS announcement of Warsaw Pact exercises during next two months

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- Chicom involvement should become apparent in a short time - some evidence of naval exercise off Shantung but not unusual for this time of year

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Para 2. Purpose - Actual Preparations for Hostilities

- Depending on completeness with which Para 1 is carried out, real preparations could be made ostensibly for realism of the exercise. Military forces at greatest true readiness just prior to exercises, anyway
- Subsequent action-employment of forces in hostilities
- Actual purpose of preparations for hostilities by Warsaw Pact forces: Probably to bring to readiness the East European (particularly GDR, but not USSR) forces to intercept initially any US Corps' punch up the access route, in order to keep Soviets clear and in flexible position for further diplomatic moves to dampen the conflict.

Para 3. Mobilization

- No evidence of general mobilization
- Number of detainees not determined though believed sizeable. Period of retention indefinite
- Several reports of callups of reserve officers
- Khrushchev statement that it might be necessary to bring divisions to full strength and increase numerical strength of army on Western frontier by moving divisions from other parts of SU (present evidence suggests part one of this now under way and part two may be planned - possibly in conjunction with Pact maneuvers).

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Para 4. High Military Officers

- Malinowski, Grechko, Sokolovski, Golibov have been on Eastern Europe tours recently, probably on inspection or planning trips
- Report of six Russian generals at Bulgarian annual reception on 23 September; none attended last year - could be for Warsaw Pact exercises
- Attendance at Congress should be verifiable, but only if announced
- No data on movement of nuclear warheads or check out of missile-warhead fittings. Two nuclear storage sites known on good evidence to be in East Germany

Para 5. Signing the Treaty

- Various indications of a tone of greater flexibility and slightly more conciliation in recent Soviet utterances on the German Treaty and Berlin-Khrushchev to Spaak, Reynaud
- No major pressure moves in Berlin or East Germany for several weeks; East German regime consolidation measures
- Should be noted that this source in [] 24 July, reported that Khrushchev intends to turn over controls at once to the East Germans - Western aircraft en route to Berlin will be shot down, tank forces will block surface routes with GDR forces in the first echelon backed by Soviet. "Strike one sharp blow, draw a little blood" and frighten the West off.

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Signing the treaty to source appears to involve not just the signature but all these actions expected to follow the signing virtually immediately. Western reaction thus appears expected early and these will be the "conditions" which will or will not warrant the "strike first"

Para 6. Party Divisions

- Unverifiable, though Mikoyan not illogical as voice of moderation
- Earlier reports from this source have frequently referred to realization by high Soviet officials of relative Soviet inferiority to West in nuclear face-off, reluctance to bring things to point of war. If true, Khrushchev is dragging the military, not vice versa
- Khrushchev view local war will become general nuclear war frequently stated to wide variety of neutrals, Westerners

Para 7. Malinowski Views

- Verified that Malinowski was in Carpathian MD at this time.

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Para 8. Party Congress

- Not verifiable yet but should be checkable prior to the Congress in pre-Congress Party issuances

Para 9. Attendance at Congress, etc.

- May be verifiable before Congress
- Should be noted that this assembly of world CP leaders would enable Soviets to both protect and control key CP personalities if anything happened after the Treaty
- Evidence already available of some effort to get other foreigners out: Western "Peace Marchers" directed to be out of the USSR by 8 October; KLM has been informed it must move from its offices and quarters in Leningradskaya Hotel in Moscow - has been offered other quarters - may bear out "fumigation" bit
- Status of Moscow PVO not verifiable
- Other evidence of Soviet air defense readiness

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Para 10. Move Against Iran

- Some relocation of Soviet ground and airborne units in Transcaucasus-Turkistan MDs in last 18 months - no urgency
- Reports of evacuations of villages in Soviet-Iranian border areas, closing of field office, wire and trenches (defensive)



- Absolutely cannot account for Soviet O/B on three US missile sites in Iran. Pegov (?) has repeatedly offered to show them to Iranians on a map

Para 11. Civil Defense Directive



- No confirmation on Cherikov
- DOSAAF badly lagging until lately. Apparently some pick up of civil defense publicity since Spring - references in [] FBIS to various films and lectures on effects of nuclear weapons in Soviet Far East (info best on that area)
- Would expect wider base organization of this order will be reflected, when it is activated, in substantial volumes of new communications
- No evidence on Reserve officers going to CD organization. Known that some reserve officer specialists have been recalled

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Para 12. Moves of Senior Soviet Officers

- Zhukov referred to at a public event in mid-September. First reappearance since ouster in 1958

Para 13. Reinforcement of GSFG

Para 14. Nuclear Tests

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SEP - The Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk domestic service in a recent broadcast of previews of television programs listed the movie "Anti-Atomic Protection of the Population." An earlier instance of an announced telecast of a civil defense program occurred in the Magadan area in June of this year.

26 SEP- []

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Comment: Albania has necessarily been included in the announcement of Warsaw Pact exercises for appearances' sake, but Tirana's recent publicity given to Soviet Bloc personnel cutbacks strongly suggests that its participation will be perfunctory at best, possibly only in an observer status.

26 SEP - Six 57 mm AAA guns were observed in position west of the Glau SAM site. This sighting is further evidenced that the Guideline missile system does not have an acceptable low altitude capability. The EGA-Berlin ring has 57 mm AAA batteries positioned adjacent to all SAM sites. This is the first observation of AAA positioned near a GSFG SAM site, although the Neuruppin SAM site was constructed near an occupied AAA site. Other GSFG SAM sites will probably have AAA batteries. In addition, 57 mm AAA emplacements have recently been observed under construction at Potsdam and Hillersleben, suggesting that increased low-level air defense for important installations is probably being installed throughout Germany. NIC Comment: We regard this as a potentially significant indicator of increased Soviet concern with air defense in East Germany. The newly observed emplacements are all either in or near the air corridors, but similar activity may be under way in other areas as well.

22 SEP - [] Soviets are improving their outpost positions on the Iranian border. There has been an increase in the number of Soviet trucks observed by Iranian army personnel and Soviet military personnel were observed plowing a strip of land along the border on 19 September.

(THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE REMOVED FROM THE NIC)


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Soviet Missile Activity


The 1961 TTMTR Program: The Soviets have fired three separate types of vehicles on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range during the 1961 program as of 27 September. These have been arbitrarily designated as "A," "B", and "C" vehicles.

The "A" program is a continuation of the ICBM and space booster vehicle fired during the 1957-1960 period. Nine "A" missiles have been fired this year--two for continued R & D testing which seems to have ended on 27 February, and the following five apparently for troop training or production checks.



To date (27 September) the 1961 extended range ballistic missile program has included two Category "B" and one Category "A" ICBMs.

After four years of anti-ballistic missile research against target missiles of 300, 700 and 1100 n.m. range, recent activity on the Sary Shagan Anti-Missile Test Complex (SSMTC) indicates the Soviets may now be entering a new program to develop a defense capability against tactical ballistic missiles.




The anti-ICBM program continues at Sary Shagan and Peschanny/UKA.



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

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Soviet Nuclear Test Activity:

Since the Soviets began their current nuclear test program on 1 September they have detonated 18 nuclear devices; seven at Semipalatinsk, 8 at Novaya Zemlya and one at Kapustin Yar.




Soviet justification for the resumption of tests has been carried in all media stressing that they are "timely defensive measures" in the face of West German and US militarism. Izvestiya accuses the US of preparing a war against the USSR, another indication that the Soviet public is being psychologically prepared for any eventualities which could include another "defense of the Motherland" campaign. (Belgrade says reports of the tests are based on "mere suppositions.") A clandestine report mentioned an Albanian UN representative's delight on hearing of the test resumption.

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
According to statements made by Soviet Cultural Counselor in India on 20 September, the Soviets have no intention of suddenly re-imposing a nuclear test ban since the current tests are designed to solve certain problems and will continue for some time. NIC Comment: This is the first indication we can recall that, contrary to expectations, the Soviets may continue testing beyond the 15 November terminal date in their announcement closing the seas around Novaya Zemlya. However, a reported statement by a TASS correspondent in New Delhi on 11 September indicates that after its current series of nuclear weapons tests, the USSR will publicly announce a unilateral three-year cessation of nuclear tests and will call on the Western powers to cease any testing in which they are engaged.



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
Soviet Atomic Satellite Blast (1):

Rumor and hearsay floating around Scandinavia has led to publication in Finland (7 September) and Sweden (8 September) of a report reputedly emanating from Poland via Vienna that Warsaw scientists believe that on the eve of the 17 October CPSU Congress the Soviets will detonate an atomic weapon satellite over Pennsylvania at a height of 1,600-2,000 km. Purpose of this shocker would be to impress President Kennedy with advisability of agreement to Soviet demands regarding "various international questions." NIC Comment: We don't believe this--but recognize that the Soviet capability to do this may well exist and Khrushchev may well make such a play, not necessarily over Pennsylvania or the US, to impress the Party Congress and awe the world just before the German Treaty is signed. Would seem to us that this could be counterproductive in arousing US to its danger, if it didn't prompt a speedy and preemptive SAC reply. Incidentally, NORAD has asked for everything available on this possible Soviet plan.

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
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
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



31 August - The presence of FITTER aircraft in East Germany was confirmed on 31 August when one was seen in flight near Finsterwalde [redacted]



NIC

Comment: The presence of these aircraft in East Germany represents a Soviet move to improve the all-weather fighter defenses in the forward area.



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[REDACTED]

NIC Comment: [REDACTED] that the Hungarian Air Force may have received new generation aircraft. Although no firm delivery flights from the USSR to Hungary can be established, a total of 15 possible new generation types may have arrived at Papa and Kiskunlachaza airfields between 18 and 24 September. These deliveries to Papa might also support collateral indications that the Hungarian Air Force has reactivated the base, which was formerly used by the Soviet Air Force in Hungary. If these indications are confirmed, Hungary would be the first Satellite air force to receive new generation fighters from the USSR.

[REDACTED]


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26 September - [REDACTED] the Soviets may be using a new or modified guidance radar with their SA-2 SAM defense system.

[REDACTED]


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Probable Soviet Aircraft Overflies Shemya on Photo Mission: An overflight of Shemya Island by a probable Soviet aircraft occurred 24 September during daylight hours. The aircraft involved was sighted by seven airmen and identified as either a BADGER or BISON. The aircraft was first observed about 40,000 feet and approached Shemya from the west southwest. It reduced altitude to an estimated 20,000 feet, overflew the island on a straight and level course, and then turned to the north.

Also, [redacted] there were no civil air or US military aircraft in the area at the time. NIC Comment: Based on the evidence, it seems probable the Soviets conducted an air photographic mission against the USAF FPS-17 radar on Shemya. The necessity for such a flight was undoubtedly prompted by the recent addition to the FPS-17 of a new missile tracking radar. (TSD)

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If these recent altitude reports are valid, the aircraft could be the modified FISHBED type fighter with the auxiliary liquid rocket engine demonstrated at the Soviet Tushino air show last July. This aircraft is considered to be capable of operating possibly up to 80,000 feet, with the auxiliary engine providing rapid acceleration and very high climb rates.

In July, the Soviets boasted of a new world altitude record of over 111,000 feet made in April 1961 by an "E-66" aircraft, described as a single-engine delta wing jet aircraft. The same "E-66" previously had been claimed as holder of a speed record of 1288 knots (average) and 1351 knots (maximum) over a 9.5 mile course. The "E-66" has never been equated to any known fighter. NIC Comment: This apparent high-altitude capability of operational Soviet fighters is evidence of the Soviets' continuing interest in increasing their air defense capability.

19 September: Unusual Flight of Possible CHICOM TU-16 Aircraft: A US Navy ASW aircraft sighted two BADGER/TU-16s on 19 September flying at 500 feet altitude in the southern part of the Sea of Japan closing to within 14 miles of the carrier Yorktown, which gained radar contact. The BADGERs turned and retired to the northwest at this low altitude. US Navy pilots identified the BADGERs and claimed they passed within one half mile of them, close enough to observe Chinese Communist markings and numerals painted on the side.

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Photography of the two BADGERs failed to confirm the markings on the aircraft but confirmed a BADGER silhouette. However, the pilots hold to their report that the aircraft had Chinese Communist markings.

Early September: Soviet Civil Defense: A Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk domestic broadcast has carried a "talk on weapons of mass destruction" by a DOSAAF public instructor, dealing in some detail with the effects of nuclear and CBR weapons. This broadcast continues a trend of the past several months toward providing the Soviet public with a little more information on weapons effects than has been the case before and has probably been undertaken in response to widening public awareness of the dangers in the present situation. 26 September: The Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk domestic service in a recent broadcast of previews of television programs listed the movie "Anti-Atomic Protection of the Population." An earlier instance of an announced telecast of a civil defense program occurred in the Magadan area in June of this year.

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
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Evaluation of Recent Soviet Aircraft Movements Into Eastern Europe



Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces do not appear to be at an abnormal order of readiness at the moment, and the posture of East German paramilitary forces appears to be normal. We see no present abnormalities in the activities or dispositions of Soviet and East German ground forces or evidence that they have been alerted,

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although such an alert could be ordered with very little or possibly no discernible warning, as was done on 13 August. GSFG has been reinforced to an undetermined extent by the arrival of new personnel and holdover of the conscript class, and recent evidence suggests that this class will be held in Germany into the new year.

We are unable to offer a convincing explanation of these aircraft movements. There is no evidence that the basic Soviet approach to the Berlin problem has altered in the direction of willingness to run increased risks; we believe they still seek to achieve their aims through negotiations held against a backdrop of Soviet determination and military readiness. It is possible, therefore, that the present movements represent only the continuation of general pressure moves against NATO in connection with Berlin. The movement of fighters into the East German base at Drewitz could be a move to build up East German air capabilities with respect to Allied access to Berlin perhaps as a counterpart in the air to the recent construction of barriers at checkpoints and the extension of areas denied to Military Liaison Missions with the obvious aim of hampering their observation of moves along the autobahn. The East German note of 16 December demanding the cessation of US military movements along the autobahn contains no immediate threats and no East German action is expected against US troop movements along the autobahn scheduled in the next few days. However, the note could provide a pretext for "temporary" closure of the autobahn for repairs at some point.

The moves of aircraft into the Soviet airbase of Kiskunlachaza in Hungary and into the Bulgarian airbase of Tolbukhin may represent a buildup to augment the

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Soviet-Satellite position in Southeast Europe, possibly in connection with a forthcoming propaganda campaign against NATO positions in Greece and Turkey similar to the recent campaign against NATO's northern flank represented by pressures on Finland and Denmark and the Khrushchev interview with Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange. (The Greek government is already aware of the movements into Bulgaria). We have no reason to believe that the Balkan movements are associated with preparations for any Soviet military move against Albania.

We know of no recent Western military actions or increases in readiness which could have triggered Soviet aircraft movements of these dimensions.

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